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weight of constitutional practice still concedes 
considerable latitude to the executive in making 
such decisions" (p. 300). Finally, Michael Glen- 
non is openly skeptical of the supposed parliarnen- 
tary trend with respect to the United States. "If 
anything," he argues, "the trend in the United 
States has been toward less accountability of the 
executive to the legislature, not more" (p. 344). 
It is also necessary to remark that the country 
reports suffer from an unfortunate omission that is 
mandated by the project's focus on a few demo- 
cratic countries. I accept the limits of space and 
coherence that bedevil any such comparative 
project. But the incredible utility of the nine sur- 
veys collected in Democratic Accountability pleads 
for the addition of others. Especially considering 
the present geopolitical climate, it would have 
been ofgreat interest to know what domestic legal 
and political processes operate in the decision to 
use force in, inter alia, Brazil, China, Egypt, Ethi- 
opia, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan, Poland, South 
Africa, and Uruguay. With the exception of Israel, 
these countries are top-twenty troop contributors 
to UN peacekeeping missions. Brazil, Israel, 
Poland, and South Africa are diverse and well-es- 
tablished democracies, presenting distinct sys- 
temic and contextual issues of certain comparative 
interest. 
There is also a compelling argument to be made 
that efforts devoted to the study of accountability 
regarding the decision to deploy soldiers are better 
focused on nondemocratic states. In such coun- 
tries, including the many African ones that con- 
tribute to the use of force under international aus- 
pices (including missions of the United Nations 
and regional organizations), the risk ofillegitimate 
uses of force and their accompanying conse- 
quences for the human rights of those countries' 
citizen-soldiers is exponentially greater than in the 
democracies considered in the book; the citizens of 
those countries lack the ability to check use-of- 
force decisions via the democratic process. 
Democratic Accountability acquits itself nobly, 
. . 
most significantly by presenting the comparative 
law community with its remarkable country 
reports. I take some exception to the way that the 
editors conceptualize the constituent elements of 
their thesis and particularly would have preferred 
a more thorough and creative treatment of democ- 
racy. Tragically, time has not borne out the book's 
broadest claim. Rather than seeing more demo- 
cratic and parliamentary authority over the use of 
force, the few short years since the book's publica- 
tion have been ones of marked decline. I say "trag- 
ically" because I share the conviction that use-of- 
force decisions increasingly must come to be 
legitimated by democratic processes. Certainly, it 
is not the editors' fault that history seems to have 
set back that agenda. To their credit, with Demo- 
cratic Accountability we have the impressive man- 
date as scholars and policymakers to press forward 
with the effort to achieve that goal. 
RUSSELL A. MILLER 
University ofIdaho College ofLaw 
The Constitzltionalization ofthe World Trade Orga- 
nization: Legitimacy, Democracy, and Commu- 
nity in the International Trading System. By 
Deborah Z. Cass. Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005. Pp. xxvi, 266. Index. 
$1 15,560, cloth; $39.95, £20, paper. 
Nonlawyers must surely be surprised to see how 
we lawyers get all worked up when the words "con- 
stitution" or "constitutionalization" are men- 
tioned. To use, or not to use, the C-word was at the 
heart of many legal discussions on the recently 
rejected constitution for Europe (or, more cor- 
rectly, Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe). In the context of that other, global 
project of economic integration-the World 
Trade Organization (WT0)-similar debates are 
raging, albeit at an earlier stage of development.' 
As Miguel Maduro points out, in the European 
context we have moved from talking about a "pro- 
cess ,of constitutionalization," to questioning 
whether such a process represents a European 
"constitution" (does Europe havea constitution?), 
and then on to discussing whether Europe requires 
a formal constitution (does Europe needa consti- 
t ~ t i o n ? ) . ~  In the WTO, in contrast, we are, for the 
For the most recent sample, see Symposium: WTO 
'Constiflltiom/ism,' 3 E U R  J, IW'L L. 623 (2006) (with 
articles by Jeffrey Dunoff ahd Joel Trachtman). 
Miguel Poiares Maduro, The Importance of Being 
Called a Constitution: Constitutional Authority and the 
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most part, still at the first stage of asking whether 
there really is a process of constitutionalization 
happening and, if so, whether this is even a good 
thing in the first place. The very title of Deborah 
Cass's book, The Constitutionalization of the 
WTO, confirms that as regards world trade we are 
- 
still talking about process (constitutionalization) 
rather than deliberate action (constitution). 
At the core of Cass's book-she is a reader in law 
at the London School of Economics-is a some- 
what circular descriptive exercise: In a three-step 
analysis that takes up six of her eight chapters, she 
concludes that the W T O  is currently not consti- 
tutionalized. In a first step, Cass gives us what she 
calls the "received account" of constitutionaliza- 
tion, an account grounded in national constitu- 
tional thinking. In her view this "conventional" 
definition requires six core elements: (1) the emer- 
gence of constraints on social, political, and eco- 
nomic behavior; (2) a new Grundnomz, or rule of 
recognition; (3) ~olitical community; (4) deliber- 
ative process; (5) realignment of relationships 
within that community; and (6) social legitimacy. 
In a second step, Cass describes the three tradi- 
tional claims according to which the W T O  is con- 
stitutionalized: (1) institutional managerialism 
(that is, John Jackson's approach of institution as 
con~titution);~ (2) rights-based constitutionalism 
(namely, Ernst-Ulrich Petersrnann's approach of 
free trade as individual rights);4 and (3) judicial 
norm-generation, which is essentially Joseph 
Weiler's idea of European constitutionalization 
through constitutional norms and structures cre- 
ated by the European Court of Justice5 (an 
approach that Cass herself adopted in previous 
work in respect of the W T O  Appellate Body, but 
now criticizes). In a third and final step, Cass tells 
us that none of these three claims of W T O  con- 
Authority of Constitutionalism, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 
332,332 (2005). 
See, e.5, JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND JUFUSPRU- 
DENCE (1998). 
See, e.5, ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, CONSTI- 
TUTIONAL FUNCTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 
(1991). 
See, e.g., J. H .  H.  Weiler, The Transformation of 
Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991). 
stitutionalization meets the "received account" of 
constitutionalization, largely because none hlfills 
(or sufficiently fulfills) the requirements of polit- 
ical community, deliberation, and social legiti- 
macy. Ergo: the W T O  is currently not constitu- 
tionalized. 
The circularity of this three-step analysis is, of 
course, apparent (and Cass readily admits that 
much). It is, after all, relatively easy to first pick 
your own definition of constitutionalization and 
then to test that definition against prevailing 
accounts of W T O  constitutionalization so as to 
come to the conclusion that, according to your 
definition, the W T O  is not constitutionalized. 
Put differently, Jackson, Petersmann, and Weiler 
never claimed that the W T O  (or, for that matter, 
the European Union) is constitutionalized in the 
way that we understand constitutionalization in 
domestic legal systems. For Cass to discover that 
claims of W T O  constitutionalization do not meet 
the standard definition of nation-state constitu- 
tionalization is therefore not that revealing. At the 
same time, it is worth remembering that constitu- 
tionalization, however we define it, operates dif- 
ferently internationally as opposed to within 
domestic polities. The big question, of course, is 
what constitutionalization can or should look l i h  
beyond the nation-state. 
In the last two chapters of her book, Cass briefly 
addresses this bigger question.G In chapter 7, she 
moves to what she calls a normative critique of 
constitutionalization, describing what she regards 
as weak, moderate, and strong anti-constitutional- 
ism. This analysis requires a major shift in gears: 
afier just being told that the W T O  is not consti- 
tutionalized, we are then presented with the cri- 
tiques of ongoing W T O  constitutionalization: 
weak anti-constitutionalists who consider that the 
W T O  has taken too many powers away from 
W T O  members; moderate anti-constitutionalists 
who "decry the failure of deliberative process in 
the W T O  and claim that constitutionalization, in 
its current form, provides inadequate guarantees 
For a more extensive analysis, seeEUROPEAN CON- 
STITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE STATE (J. H. H. 
Weiler & Marlene Wind eds., 2003). 
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of transparency, participation, and accountabil- 
ity" (p. 209). But rather than setting forth norma- 
tive positions against constitutionalization as 
such, these so-called weak and moderate forms of 
anti-constitutionalism present critiques ofthe cur- 
rent W T O  system tout court (irrespective of con- 
stitutionalization) or, at best, analyses of how the 
W T O  is wrongly or not sufficiently constitution- 
alized, Only what Cass calls strong anti-constitu- 
tionalists7 object to the very idea that the W T O  
has become constitutionalized, and it is only this 
group that normatively objects to any constitu- 
tionalization, specifically because in the W T O  
context, constitutional language appears to give 
that organization a normative aura and legitimacy 
that it does not actually have or deserve.' 
Although Cass does not explicitly adopt any of 
these three anti-constitutionalist critiques, from 
the outset she makes it clear that "the W T O  is not 
constitutionalized, and nor, according to any cur- 
rent meanings of the term, should it ben (p. x, 
emphasis added). It is therefore somewhat surpris- 
ing to read the last chapter of her book, which, 
instead of maintaining an anti-constitutionalist 
stance, seems to opt for what many might regard as 
constitutionalization on steroids. Combining (1) 
the mismatch she found earlier in the book 
between the received (national) account of consti- 
tutionalization and the traditional claims that the 
WTO is currently constitutionalized and (2) the 
triple critique against constitutionalization (dis- 
cussed above) as it now plays out in the WTO, 
chapter 8 of the book (less than nine pages long) 
calls for "a radical rethinking of the language and 
structures of constitutionalization." Cass refers, 
more specifically, to "[tlransnational constitu- 
tionalization" or a "transformed constitutionaliza- 
tion which challenges our current perceptions of 
that phenomenon" (p. 208). 
Based on earlier work by Thomas Cottier (in 
the W T O  context) and Neil Walker (in the EU 
context), Cass promotes the now commonly pro- 
posed idea of constitutionalization as a five-story 
house, "with each storey representing one of the 
layers of governance from sub-local to interna- 
tional, through local, national, and regional" (p. 
240) .9 Struggling not with the term constitutionaG 
izdtion, but the equally contested notion of sover- 
eignty, the core message of John Jackson's latest 
book is similar. He speaks of "slicing" the concept 
of sovereignty and explains that "most of the allo- 
cation [of power] problems are not black or white, 
but involve some gradation of 'ceding of sover- 
eignty' as a matter ofdegree, not kind."lOSo far, so 
good. What makes me use the expression consti- 
tutionalization on steroids, however, is that Cass's 
proposal for transformed constitutionalization 
goes well beyond this structural view of what is 
often referred to as multilayered governance (to 
avoid the terms constitutionalization and sover- 
eignty). Indeed, what she calls for is to marry this 
approach "with a more substantive, thicker,' 
notion of trading democracy as economic devel- 
opment . . . [:] [a] procedurAly transformed, sub- 
stantively democratic, argumentative form of 
W T O  constitutionalization" (p. 5). For Cass, 
"Putting trading democracy, emphasizing devel- 
opment, at the heart of the W T O  is neces- 
sary . . . in order to reflect the authentic desires of 
the putative international trade community" (p. 
243). These are, of course, strong words and very 
ambitious goals: WTO-wide democracy, both 
' Best represented by Robert 8r Wso procedurally and substantive; development and Nicolaidis, Legitimacy dnd Global Govenance: Why 
C~nstitutionalizdn~the WTO Isa Step Too Far, in EFFI- as the primary goal 
CIENCY, EOUITY. AND LEGITIMACY: THE MULTI- the WTO; and development of a trade commu- 
LATERAL T ~ I N G  SYSTEM AT THE MILLENNIUM 
227 (Roger B. Porter, Pierre Sauve, Arvind Subrama- 
nian, & Arnerico Beviglia Zampetti eds., 2001). 
* See, more recently, Jeffrey Dunoff, Constitutional 
Conceits: The WTO 5 Constitution 'and the Discipline of 
InternatianalLaw, 17 EUR. J. INT'LL. 647,647 (2006) 
("Might international lawyers use constitutional dis- 
course as a rhetorical strategy designed to invest interna- 
tional law with the power and authority that domestic 
constitutional structures and norms possess? If so, this 
strategy may be self-defeating."). 
nity (WTO polity?). The question, of course, is 
whether the W T O  can-and, according to many, 
See also Joel P. Trachtman, The Constitutions of the 
WTO, 17 EUR. J .  INT'L L. 623,625 (2006) (speaking 
of "three intertwined elephants": the domestic, WTO, 
and general international law levels). 
'O JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, THE WTO, 
AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNA- 
TIONAL LAW 2 15 (2006). 
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ever should-achieve these ambitious goals. Just 
as important is the question whether, if one sets 
this grand agenda for the WTO, one is not des- 
tined to disappoint. If a truly democratic, deliber- 
ative European community has turned out to be 
extremely difficult to achieve, if not illusory, how 
can we expect the global W T O  to perform? 
When it comes to the WTO, I propose to avoid 
the word constitutionalization as much as we can 
or, at least, to move beyond the semantics and def- 
initional questions of constitution or no constitu- 
tion. I do not mean to deny that, at the W T O  
level, constitutionalization is occurring. Of 
course, it is, even at the international level. If one 
understands constitutionalization in its objective 
dimension as a fundamental scheme wherein pow- 
ers are divided, then surely the WTO is constitu- 
tionalized. When I explain to my students the 
1994 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
WTO, with its sixteen articles on the WTO's 
scope, functions, structure, budget, decision mak- 
ing, and membership, I do often call it the W T O  
"Constitution." Indeed, from this objective, struc- 
tural perspective, the Marrakesh Agreement is no 
less of a constitution than the UN Charter, the 
(officially termed) Constitution of the Interna- 
tional Labour Organization (ILO) or, for that 
matter, the constitution of your local golf or bowl- 
ing club. Unlike the constitution of a bowling 
club, however, the WTO treaty also fulfills what 
many regard as .the constitutional function of 
tying the hands of governments to economically 
sound free trade policies, enabling them to resist 
special interest groups clamoring for welfare-re- 
ducing protectionism. ' To so elevate particular 
objectives (in the case of the WTO, liberal trade 
and principles of nondiscrimination) above the 
day-to-day logrolling of politics is a staple feature 
of all domestic constitutions. For example, to 
'' This view was held not only by Neo-Kantians such 
as Petersmann, but also by American conservatives, even 
those generally concerned with preserving U.S. sover- 
eignty. See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movse- 
sian, World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
5 1 1, 5 15 (2000) (arguing that since protectionism 
inherently harms the majority, W T O  agreements tying 
the hands of domestic politicians to the mas1 of free 
trade "act to restrain protectionist interest groups, 
thereby promoting both free trade and democracy"). 
avoid majoritarian abuse of minorities (remem- 
ber, Hitler was democratically elected), most 
national constitutions guarantee nondiscrimina- 
tion and other fundamental rights. Finally , 'f I one 
understands constitutionalization as involving 
normative constraints on behavior and also the 
balancing of fundamental interests, there can be 
no doubt that these elements can be seen in W T O  
rules and W T O  Appellate Body rulings-which 
aim at restricting the economic conduct of 
W T O  members and, in the process, must bal- 
ance free trade principles against other goals, such 
as health, the environment, and the protection of 
public morals. 
In all of these ways, the W T O  is unquestion- 
ably constitutionalized. But then again, in so 
many other ways, the W T O  is absolutely notcon- 
stitutionalized. There is no question of a W T O  
polity or of a closely knit community of individ- 
uals that has mandated power to the W T O  (the 
way, for example, that the U.S. or French people 
mandated power through the U.S. or French con- 
stitution). Unlike EU bodies (such as the Euro- 
pean Commission and the European Council), 
W T O  organs do not even have legislative capacity 
of their own. Nor does the W T O  offer any indi- 
vidual rights to citizens against their, or another, 
government. The W T O  is and remains a treaty 
between states. As the recent failure of the Doha 
Round sharply reminded us, this treatywas made, 
and can only be amended with, the consent of all 
W T O  members. The WTO is, in other words, a 
political bargain between governments. It is 
largely from and through those governments that 
W T O  deliberation and legitimacy flows. In that 
sense, the W T O  is an intergovernmental institu- 
tion, not a supranational constitution. In addi- 
tion, the WTO is and remains a trade agreement. 
At best, it serves a functional community centered 
on the activity and consequences of trade. Finally, 
unlike EU law, which has supremacy and direct 
effect in member states, W T O  members are free 
to decide what effect they give to W T O  rules in 
their own legal system, and they do not need to 
give supremacy to W T O  provisions. Even when 
the Appellate Body condemns government poli- 
cies, there are the temporary escape valves of com- 
pensation and of simply suffering retaliation. In 
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addition, countries can renegotiate and unilater- 
ally change their tariffs and specific services com- 
mitments (subject to compensation or retalia- 
tion), and effectively reimpose trade restrictions 
through safeguards and antidumping duties. 
From that perspective, the W T O  is more like a 
Swiss cheese than a free trade constitution written 
in stone. 
In sum, is the W T O  constitutionalized? Yes, in 
many ways it is (especially in its objective, struc- 
tural dimension), but in many other ways it is nor 
(especially in the subjective, community dimen- 
sion of constitutionalization). Within a normative 
context-sbouldthe W T O  be (further?) constitu- 
tionalized?-constitutional discourse is even 
more ambiguous. As a result, it may be better to 
avoid the term altogether, but not because consti- 
tutionalization is alien to the W T O  or because 
international affairs do not or should not raise 
constitutional questions. The W T O  is obviously, 
at least to some extent, constitutionalized already, 
and international law itself raises crucial questions 
of a constitutional nature.'* It is for a reason that 
despite the absence of any reference in the W T O  
treaty to a W T O  constitution, W T O  constitu- 
tionalization has become such a debate: what the 
W T O  does, matters (it affects all of us) and is for 
real (its rules are effectively enforced). The same 
reason explains why, notwithstanding the official 
presence of an ILO Constitution, few are worried 
or writing about ILO constitutionalition. Rather, 
in the W T O  context I would avoid the terms consti- 
tution and constitutionalization altogether because 
of their inherently contested nature and the subjec- 
tive baggage that they carry with them. 
Thinking only of the divide between Europe 
and the United States (and thus making light of 
even greater diversities among W T O  members 
such as China, Saudi Arabia, and, soon, Russia), 
Jeb Rubenfeld has recently described what he sees 
as profoundly different constitutional traditions 
in Europe as opposed to the United States.13 In 
Europe, Rubenfeld finds what he calls "interna- 
l 2  For an overview, see Erika de Wet, The Interna- 
tional Constitutional Order, 5 5 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 5 l 
(2006). 
l3  Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutional- 
ism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971 (2004) 1971. 
tional constitutionalism," and in the United 
States, "democratic constitutionalism." For him, 
the latter, American approach "sees constitutional 
law as the foundational law a particular polity has 
given itself through a special act of popular law- 
makingM-a constitution based on "deliberation 
and consent" that ultimately remains subject to 
the flexibility of politics. In contrast, for Ruben- 
feld, the former, European approach "sees consti- 
tutional law not as an act of democratic self-gov- 
ernance but as a check or restraint on democracy 
deriving its authority from its expression of uni- 
versal rights and principles that transcend national 
boundariesy'-a constitution based on "reflection 
and choice" whose commitments stand above pol- 
itics and can therefore be readily international- 
ized.14 If Rubenfeld is correct, this difference 
surely does not bode well for selling any type of 
W T O  or international constitution to the United 
States, if only because of how the United States 
understands and has lived the term constitution at 
home. For Europeans, who are by now somewhat 
used to multilayered constitutionalism, using con- 
stitutional language in an organization where the 
United States plays a prominent role (be it the 
W T O  or the United Nations) may therefore be 
counterproductive. The term or terminology 
alone might sink what is otherwise a sensible pro- 
posal. 
A more productive exercise is to accept and 
respect the special features of cooperation at the 
WTO-which Joseph Weiler in the European 
context has referred to as Europe's S o n d e r ~ e ~ ' ~ -  
and to move beyond constitutional semantics, in 
search of solutions to specific problems of power 
sharing, competence delimitation, legitimization, 
and accountability. At the end of the day, the core 
question is notwhether to constitutiondize or not, 
but how to find a balance between international 
commitment (law) and domestic demands for 
I*  Id. at 1971. 
l5 J. H. H. Weiler, In Defence of the S t a m  Quo: 
Europe; Constitutional Sondenveg, in EUROPEAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM BEYOND THE STATE, supra 
note 6 ,  at 7. The term Sondeiwegwas traditionally used 
to describe the "special pathn that Germany followed- 
that is, Germany's own, unique course (including 
National Socialism and the Holocaust) as determined 
by its own evolution and history. 
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flexibility (politics), and between efficiency (in 
case of the WTO, through liberalized trade) and 
legitimacy, contestation, and participation.16 As 
Cass herself points out, "the language of constitu- 
tionalization is likely to obfuscate the debate, 
diminish the more quotidian achievements of the 
W'TO, and deflect scholarly attention from other, 
less glamorous aspects of its functioning" (p. 23). 
Would it not therefore be better to shelve the 
C-word and to move to mapping out the specifics 
of the WTO's own Sonderweg? 
J o o s ~  PAUWELYN 
Dzlke University SchoolofLaw 
The World Trade Organization: Law, Practice and 
Policy. 2d ed. By Mitsuo Matsushita, Thomas 
J. Schoenbaum, and Petros C. Mavroidis. 
Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 
2006. Pp. cvii, 989. Index. $235.00, £140, 
cloth; $79.50, £40, paper. 
The much expanded second edition of The 
World Trade Organization: Law, Practice and Pol- 
icy by Mitsuo Matsushita, Thomas Schoenbaum, 
and Petros Mavroidis is a welcome addition to the 
growing collection of treatises, textbooks, and 
handbooks on W T O  law and trade regulation 
generally. The authors ofthis handbook (and I will 
say more about the term shortly) are accomplished 
trade scholars with vast experience in both aca- 
demic and policy ,settings, including within the 
W T O  (Matsushita, for example, is a member of 
the W T O  Appellate Body). They are uniquely 
qualified to present this exposition of W T O  law 
and policy. 
This book fits well into the small, but bright, 
constellation of reference works on international 
trade and the W T O  system. The bookis more sys- 
tematic and up-to-date than John Jackson's 1997 
"reference monograph," The World Trading Sys- 
tem, while sharing the latter's predominantly doc- 
trinal approach and comfortable blend of law and 
policy. The book is similar in topical coverage to 
Michael Trebilcock and Robert Howse's The Reg- 
'' For a full discussion, see Joost Pauwelyn, The 
Transfornation of World Trade, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1 
(2005). 
ulation oflntermtional Trade, but differs in that it 
lacks the latter's sustained intellectual argument (a 
"law and economics" approach to trade policy), 
unless one considers the book's implicit pragma- 
tism to be an indicator of the authors' intellectual 
position, which it well might be. Peter Van den 
Bossche's admirable treatise, The Law andpolicy of 
the World Trade Organization, is by nature more of 
a textbook-which highlights the current work's 
value as what I would term a handbook-style ref- 
erence: it is quicker to use and refreshingly direct 
in presentation. Ifone feels constrained by the nec- 
essary brevity of a handbook-style approach to 
such a complex topic, one can always supplement 
it by consulting, for example, Raj Bhala's excellent 
Modern GATT Law, which is narrower but 
deeper. 
Turning to the substance of this newly pub- 
lished second edition, the authors' stated goal is to 
offer an updated overview of W T O  law, includ- 
ing recent developments in dispute settlement as 
well as the increasingly important agriculture and 
government procurement areas. In this context, 
the book is a spectacular success. The range of top- 
ics is comprehensive without being ponderous, the 
prose is quite lucid, and the discussion well-orga- 
nized. I found it a wonderful and refreshing review 
course, despite my having taught trade law for 
thirteen years. 
Contrary to standard practice, I suggest that 
one begin by reading the book's final chapter, on 
future challenges facing the WTO. Three of the 
four fundamental challenges listed by the authors 
are carried over from the first edition (published in 
2003, only three years earlier): institutional 
reform, particularly on the norm-creating side; 
managing the global social issues linked to trade; 
and integrating developing countries. The fourth 
challenge, added in the second edition, involves 
the recent surge of regional and bilateral free trade 
agreements. I agree wholeheartedly with this list; 
indeed, I think it would only have improved the 
book if the authors had incorporated these chal- 
lenges into the organization of the entire treatise. 
In my view they are not merely "future" chal- 
lenges, but present, systemic issues affecting the 
WTO's legitimacy and effectiveness on a daily 
